







HANS A. LINDE∗ 
What Is a Constitution, What Is Not, 
and Why Does It Matter? 
he occasion for today’s conference is the 150th anniversary of 
Oregon’s statehood, not of its constitutional text.  These are not 
the same thing.  How and why the two are related has, or should have, 
important legal consequences. 
I 
WHAT DO CONSTITUTIONS CONSTITUTE? 
Statehood does not depend on a written “constitution.”  This is 
evident from the long history of monarchies, including the United 
Kingdom, and of an original state like Rhode Island.  Authority to 
govern might rest on unwritten traditions or religious sanctions, on 
such established customs as lines of succession to hereditary offices, 
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or be defined by formal agreements like Magna Carta and later by 
statutes and by parliamentary rules.1  Details found in some state 
constitutions are left to rules in others.  Election laws, not 
constitutional text, specify whose names qualify to appear on official 
ballots, with or without party designations, and thereby entrench 
partisan government or leave parties as unofficial organizations.  The 
most primitive state has a political constitution in this sense, or others 
will not recognize it as a state. 
Institutions created by a founding text develop their own myths.  
Sometimes the political constitution rests on faulty assumptions that 
familiar practices are legally required, on tradition more than the 
written text.  Oregon legislators may assume that meeting annually 
needs approval as a constitutional amendment, but the text can be 
read merely to mandate meeting at least every second year.2  Oregon 
judges have imported federal doctrines of nonjusticiability into the 
state’s judicial article, whose text only guarantees that the courts 
cannot be deprived of the judicial power.  The text does not limit what 
else lawmakers may ask judges to do.3  For Oregon’s centennial, a 
half-century ago, a commission prepared a modern Oregon 
constitution, which passed the house of representatives but fell one 
vote short in the senate.4  The Oregon court held that voters could not 
initiate a version of the text because it was a “revision,” although the 
designers of Oregon’s initiative system had proceeded to draft many 
 
1 Books on the British Constitution, besides those tracing historic developments from 
before and after Magna Carta, mainly have been commentaries on royal, parliamentary, 
and electoral institutions rather than on judicial interpretations of “constitutional” text.  For 
several 19th century examples, see, e.g., WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1872); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1885).  For a modern collection of essays, see also THE BRITISH 
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 2003). 
2 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 10. 
3 Article VII, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution, only “vests” (i.e., secures) the 
“Judicial power of the State” in the courts. 
 More relevant is article III, section 1, which forbids a person charged with official 
duties in one of the three departments of government to “exercise any of the functions of 
another.”  Is presiding over and attesting to a wedding such a function?  Is responding to 
formal legal questions with a nondecisive opinion of the justices (not of “the Court”) such 
a function? And if so, whose? Similarly, the constitution does not assign to any department 
an exclusive function of answering formal legal questions with a published opinion. 
4 The commission’s report, its draft, and alternative versions appear in a symposium 
issue in the Oregon Law Review.  A Symposium on State Constitutional Revision, 67 OR. 
L. REV. 127 (1988). 
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equally far reaching amendments; the new term was added only in 
1960 to permit the legislature to submit “revisions” to the voters.5 
There are legal limits on governmental design.  The early 
Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, required that future 
states formed in the Northwest Territory must have republican forms 
of government.6  The subsequent admission process, as well as 
tradition, demanded written constitutions—thereby also turning 
constitutional disputes into lawyers’ debates over interpreting legal 
texts.  Accordingly, two years before statehood, Oregon’s convention 
prepared the original constitution, much of it copied from other 
states.7  The designers of American constitutions made them harder to 
amend than ordinary laws, securing their other basic structures and 
sensitive guarantees of personal liberty against legislative majorities.8  
But this device also encourages sponsors of any desired policy to 
make whatever extra effort is required to cement their policy into the 
state’s constitution, beyond the reach of future policy makers.  This, 
in turn, raises a question whether criteria beyond added procedures 
distinguish constitutions from ordinary laws. 
The answer is yes; but for a century of statehood, Oregon had few 
occasions to face the question.  The constitution required amendments 
 
5 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Holmes v. Appling, 237 Or. 546, 392 P.2d 636 (1964).  The 
two justices who had served on the commission, K.J. O’Connell and T. Goodwin, JJ., did 
not participate in this decision; Justice Sloan, dissenting, cited the history of earlier 
initiatives proposing far-reaching amendments that was collected in plaintiffs’ brief.  
Holmes, 237 Or. at 555–58, 392 P.2d at 640–41. 
6 Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio 
(“Northwest Ordinance of 1787”), ch. 8, art. 5, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789) (“Provided the 
constitution and government so to be formed, shall be republican, and in conformity to the 
principles contained in these articles . . . .”). 
7 Oregon and Kansas were the last two states admitted before the Civil War, but the 
1857 convention consigned the most highly charged issues—slavery and the status of non-
Caucasian people in the state—to a vote separate from the proposed Constitution.  The 
voters decisively rejected slavery but endorsed other racist provisions.  See, e.g., OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 31 (repealed 1970) (entitling only “white” foreign settlers residing in the 
state to the same property rights as native born citizens); OR. CONST. art. II, § 6 (repealed 
1927) (denying right of suffrage to “Negroes, Chinamen and Mulattoes”).  The convention 
discussions are summarized in Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of 
the Oregon Constitution of 1857— Part I (Articles I & II), 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 469, 
549–52, 579–606.  At the time, federal law excluded Chinese from U.S. citizenship, and 
the 14th Amendment’s definition of U.S. citizens lay a decade in the future. 
8 In democracies that rely on parliamentary representation of a diversity of political 
parties, amendments often require no more than a two-thirds majority of votes.  Where 
power essentially is concentrated in a single leader, elected or otherwise, such a leader 
often seeks popular endorsement of his program in the form of a plebiscite on a new 
constitution, regardless whether the existing one provides for this method. 
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to pass two consecutive legislative sessions and then win adoption by 
the voters, so the original version remained intact for forty-three 
years.  In 1897, a Republican split over choosing a U.S. Senator 
allowed Democrats and Populists to prevent a legislative quorum.  
The price of resuming the state’s business was to submit to the voters 
the means of direct popular intervention in government, by initiating 
or referring bills and recalling elected officials.9  After passage in the 
1899 and 1901 sessions, these innovations won a large majority of 
voters in 1902.10 
Why the city of Portland at once challenged their validity, in a case 
that involved no direct legislation and that the city won on other 
grounds, is a political mystery.11  But the Kadderly case gave the 
Oregon Supreme Court the first opportunity to defend the new 
system.  After reviewing classic passages from the Federalist Papers, 
Justice Bean’s opinion concluded that direct popular lawmaking was 
compatible with republican government as long as the state’s elected 
representatives retained the power to repeal a law or enact a new one.  
Other states quickly followed.12  When Oregon voters first initiated a 
law—a telephone tax—the U.S. Supreme Court (against a background 
of the same political split over Eastern financial and Western agrarian 
interests, as Norman Williams has recounted13) disclaimed its own 
jurisdiction—though not the duty of state officials and judges—to 
 
9 David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William Simon 
U’Ren and “The Oregon System,” 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 947 (1994).  Judge Schuman 
describes U’Ren’s role in organizing and leading groups outside the party system to win 
enactment and later making use of direct legislation. 
10 Could a legislature make some or all laws contingent on prior approval by voters (or 
other entities) when state constitutions are silent on this question?  Judicial opinions have 
denied it, though Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., dissenting, saw nothing in the 
Massachusetts Constitution to deny legislators this option.  See In re Municipal Suffrage to 
Women, 36 N.E. 488 (Mass. 1894); Hart v. Paulus, 296 Or. 352, 676 P.2d 1384 (1984); 
Opinion of the Justices, 725 A.2d 1082, 1089 (N.H. 1999). 
11 Kadderly v. City of Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903).  I am indebted to Judge 
Henry Breithaupt for pointing out that Portland’s then-mayor was former Senator George 
Williams, who also was president of the Direct Legislation League.  See DAVID ALLEN 
JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST: CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND NEVADA, 1840–1890, 
at 299.  Perhaps, given the small circle of 19th-century Oregon’s political class, Williams 
had reason for confidence in the outcome. 
12 Kadderly and later cases were reviewed more fully in Hans A. Linde, When Initiative 
Lawmaking is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 
OR. L. REV. 19 (1993). 
13 Norman R. Williams, Direct Democracy, the Guaranty Clause, and the Politics of the 
“Political Question” Doctrine: Revisiting Pacific Telephone, 87 OR. L. REV. 979 (2008). 
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decide the constitutional issue.  After 1903, Oregon, in effect, had its 
second constitution. 
The constitutional challenge to Oregon’s newly adopted system 
was that direct lawmaking departed from a republican form of 
government, not in its details, but in principle.  In turn, Kadderly’s 
response was not a blueprint but an intelligible principle for their 
coexistence.  A republican government must be responsible to its 
citizens, hence periodically chosen by them—unlike the individual 
citizens, often a small fraction, who choose to vote on some measure 
or to ignore it without pretending to represent anyone else.  This 
shortcoming does not prevent voter plebiscites on referred or initiated 
measures, as long as lawmaking by representatives remains the 
indispensable ongoing institution.  Moreover, a republican 
government must be a government as well as republican.  It must be 
able to govern; anarchy, however appealing to libertarians, does not 
qualify. 
Kadderly’s defense of popular lawmaking neglected to mention 
initiatives to enact “amendments to the Constitution”14 by the same 
simple majority vote as “laws” but beyond change by elected 
representatives.  The new system’s triumphant sponsors quickly 
initiated major changes in the government, including equal suffrage 
and municipal home rule, and others that were rejected.15 
A century ago, after fifty years of statehood, these developments 
occupied two conventions of the Oregon State Bar Association, with 
formal addresses by lawyers who were brought up with classic 
histories of Greece, Rome, and England, the Federalist Papers, and 
the writings of Macauley, de Toqueville, and Bryce.16  The Speaker of 
Oregon’s House of Representatives, C.N. McArthur, in explaining 
why the legislature proposed a new constitutional convention, 
deplored placing statutory matter into state constitutions, including 
matters of private law, which was exacerbated by allowing easy 
amendments upon initiative petitions.  “On the whole,” he observed, 
 
14 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(a). 
15 See OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, 2007–08, at 296–99 
(2007) (tables of initiative measures adopted between 1902 and 1914 in Oregon Bluebook 
(2008)).  Among the rejects was one described as “U’ren’s Constitution,” a radical 
restructuring to abolish the state senate and introduce proportional representation in the 
single assembly, which shows that the original understanding of “amendment” did not 
distinguish it from “revision.” 
16 PROCEEDINGS OF THE OREGON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, 1908–1909, 1909–1910, 
at 18, 84, 139, 148 (addresses of Charles H. Carey, F.T. Post, Walter P. La Roche, and 
C.N. McArthur). 
 722 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 717 
“the adoption of the Initiative and Referendum is breaking down 
distinctions heretofore made between the processes of legislation and 
constitutional amendments,” so that the constitution could not reliably 
serve “to protect minorities, to guarantee certain rights, and to insure 
a republican form of government.”17  In practice, however, the 
original sponsors of the Oregon system did respect that distinction, 
before later generations ignored it. 
But their generation understood and respected the distinction 
between laws governing individuals and the constitution of 
government.  That respect was swept aside by two later 
developments: the advent of paid signature gatherers, and the 
discovery by well-heeled movements that Oregon’s small electorate 
offered a low cost way to raise a cause du jour to constitutional 
stature.  The results can be described as Oregon’s third constitution, 
including a detailed program for prison work,18 a wholesale easing of 
constraints on criminal prosecutions (relabeled as “victim’s rights”)19 
and a detailed section on property taxes that fills 120 column 
inches.20  Some of these measures, and others that failed, would not 
meet the test laid down in Kadderly for republican government: that 
laws could be made by direct legislation as long as elected 
representatives remain able to amend or repeal these laws and courts 
can test them against the constitution.  Legislators and courts lose 
these powers when a law is locked into the constitution, which, of 
course, is the purpose of initiating a law as an amendment.21 
II 
WHO SECURES “REPUBLICAN” GOVERNMENT? 
What is the responsibility of a state’s lawyers and judges for 
preserving republican governance?  The textual answer is 
unequivocal.  Under the supremacy clause, the U.S. Constitution is 
 
17 C.N. McArthur, The Need for a Constitutional Convention, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
OREGON BAR ASSOCIATION 153–54 (1913).  At a later time, McArthur might have added 
Florida’s experience with a system that allows initiatives only for constitutional 
amendments, without specifying what qualifies as an amendment. 
18 OR. CONST. art. I, § 41. 
19 OR. CONST. art. I, § 42. 
20 OR. CONST. art. XI, § 11. 
21 Because the guarantee clause challenge was to initiative lawmaking, I do not here 
deal with constitutional amendments submitted by the legislature itself, i.e., by the 
responsible elected representatives that this challenge demands.  The text of article IV, 
section 1 of the Oregon Constitution leaves the issue open. 
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“the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.”22  The founders entrusted the 
Constitution to state judges.  Federal judges were not even given 
general jurisdiction over federal questions until 1875.23 
Some state courts, including Oregon’s, have been confused by—or 
have seized upon—Chief Justice White’s “political question” label in 
the Pacific Telephone case to evade that responsibility.24  But this has 
not deterred judges from issuing numerous advisory opinions of the 
Justices, where these are used, on diverse issues of republican 
government. 
Lawyers distrust law in the absence of judicial decisions: what is 
the use of knowing the right answer if there is no institution to 
validate and apply it?  But often that authority—and responsibility—
exists outside courts.  In 1998, Attorney General Hardy Myers, then 
recently elected, said that before he advised officials about an issue of 
republican government, he wanted to know whether courts would 
review it,25 though justice department litigators continued to resist 
such review with the routine invocation that it was “nonjusticiable.”26  
 
22 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
23 The Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, § 1. 
24 See Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 COLO. L. 
REV. 709 (1994).  The issue later was raised in two Colorado cases.  In Evans v. Romer, 
882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Colorado 
court chose familiar equal protection formulas to invalidate an amendment barring 
legislation to protect minority sexual orientation, passing over a claim that the initiative 
process was a nonrepublican means to such an amendment.  In Morrissey v. State, 951 
P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998), the same court held that a term limits initiative governing 
congressional elections violated Article V of the U.S. Constitution and ran contrary to the 
principle of representative government established in the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.  
Because the court rested its opinion on a violation of Article V, however, it saw no need to 
decide whether the latter basis was justiciable.  Morrissey, 951 P.2d at 916 n.9; see also 
David B. Frohnmayer & Hans A. Linde, State Court Responsibility for Maintaining 
“Republican Government”: An Amicus Curiae Brief, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1487 
(2003) (Brief of Hans A. Linde and David B. Frohnmayer as Amici Curiae in Support of 
the Petition for Certiorari, cert. denied, Sawyer v. Or. ex rel. Huddleston, 118 S. Ct. 557 
(1997)). 
25 Hardy Myers, The Guarantee Clause and Direct Democracy, 34 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 659, 660 (1998). 
26 See Or. ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or. 597, 932 P.2d 1145 (1997).  After the 
defendant in that case petitioned for certiorari, an inquiry from the U.S. Supreme Court 
gave the department the opportunity to agree to the writ; instead it filed a response arguing 
against it.  See Frohnmayer & Linde, supra note 24, at 1488 (Editor’s Historical Note) (“It 
is possible that Attorney General Hardy Myers, who took office while staff counsel were 
litigating the appeal, later wished that the Department instead had responded that it had no 
objection to the requested Supreme Court review, in the hope of clarifying the question of 
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A decade later, however, senate president Peter Courtney requested 
an opinion of the attorney general (Hardy Myers) on the subject.  
These were the stated questions and the short answers: 
First Question: Does the United States Constitution obligate the 
State of Oregon to maintain a republican form of government? 
Short Answer: Yes. 
Second Question: If so, is this legal obligation binding on all state 
public officials, irrespective of whether or how the obligation is 
judicially enforced?  Short Answer: Yes. 
Third Question: If so, may state officials obtain the legal opinion or 
advice of the Oregon Attorney General on questions of compliance 
with the obligation?  Short Answer: Appropriate state officials may 
present questions about compliance with the Guarantee Clause to 
the Attorney General. 
Fourth Question: In the absence of modern substantive decisions by 
the United States Supreme Court, may answers to such questions be 
derived from historic sources and opinions of courts in Oregon and 
in other states?  Short Answer: The listed sources may provide 
useful guidance in answering this type of question. 
Fifth Question: May the Legislature by statute set impartial 
standards and procedures for assuring adherence to a republican 
form of government, so long as the statute does not contravene the 
United States Constitution?  Short Answer: The Oregon legislature 
may establish impartial standards and procedures intended to assure 
a republican form of government, so long as the legislation does not 
contravene the Oregon Constitution, the United States Constitution, 
or governing federal law.27 
The question, then, is whether Oregon’s elected leaders, in any of 
the three branches, care to defend their institutional authority and 
responsibility.  A policy once endorsed by a majority of votes (even if 
not of voters) may gain a mythic quality in the political constitution 
even when a state, like Washington, allows only statutory initiatives 
but not constitutional amendments. 
 
whether the Department’s advice on questions of republican government would or would 
not be reviewable in the state’s courts.”). 
27 Or. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 8286 (2008), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/agoffice/ 
agopinions/op8286.pdf.  The full opinion footnoted that it remains an open question 
whether the Oregon court’s Huddleston decision “is a correct extension” of Pacific 
Telephone’s denial of federal jurisdiction.  Id. at 6 n.1.  Cf. Frohnmayer & Linde, supra 
note 24, at 1488 (Editor’s Historical Note). 
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III 
“MAY NOTS” OR “SHALLS” 
Sometimes the difference between a “law” and an “amendment to 
the constitution” depends on the chosen wording, so that the 
proponents may, consistent with Kadderly, phrase a proposed 
amendment as a negation rather than an affirmative command.  Other 
measures may be nonrepublican in substance.28  But how does a 
restraint on government, which may be initiated as a constitutional 
amendment, differ from a mandate, which may be initiated only as a 
law?  What some may criticize as empty formalism often has practical 
importance.  An amendment barring government pensions without 
specified contributions from public employees leaves lawmakers a 
choice whether to provide pensions at all or, if an amendment bars 
pensions altogether, some other benefit.  A command addressed to 
employees to contribute to a pension leaves lawmakers no such 
choice.  It can properly be initiated as a law but not as a constitutional 
amendment.29  The telephone tax at issue in Pacific Telephone was 
initiated as a law; to cast it as an amendment might well have struck 
this early initiative’s sponsors as bizarre. 
Important as constitutional structures and processes are, Americans 
early and always coupled “republican” government with the assertion 
of personal rights.  But they understood constitutional rights as 
restrictions of official power, many of them reflecting the grievances 
charged against King George III in the Declaration of Independence, 
limits on authority that could be respected by officials or enforced by 
judges, or should be so understood even when stated as rights.  Here, 
too, later case law sometimes reflects familiar but inappropriate 
formulas as much as a constitutional text.  The Oregon court for a 
time misread a guarantee of a remedy for tortious injuries, somewhat 
as the U.S. Supreme Court has simply omitted the word “process” 
from the due process clause to review the substance of state 
 
28 Constitutional limits on taxing, borrowing, or spending, for instance, formally are 
restrictions on legislators; they are problematic when voters are invited to enact tax cuts as 
separately attractive initiative amendments without specifying a corresponding cut in 
spending or a source of compensating revenue. 
29 Cf. Atiyeh v. State, 323 Or. 413, 918 P.2d 795 (1996), discussed in David B. 
Frohnmayer & Hans A. Linde, Initiating “Laws” in the Form of “Constitutional 
Amendments”: An Amicus Curiae Brief, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 749 (1998) (Editor’s 
Historical Note). 
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policies.30  The process of case–by-case adjudication inexorably 
produces decision by adjectives, such as labeling some constitutional 
rights but not others as “fundamental”—without, however, explaining 
how these may equally be repealed by a simple majority of self-
selected voters.31 
A right that is stated as a denial of official power leaves open many 
other choices of action, or inaction.  When judges enforce such a 
denial, they invade no legal authority.  In contrast, a bare declaration 
of an affirmative right only creates a legal conundrum.  When a 
California ballot measure added the word “privacy” to the opening 
phrase of the state’s constitution,32 the California Supreme Court 
rejected the traditional understanding of rights as negating 
government power, citing explanatory statements that the ballot 
measure protected privacy also against nongovernmental actors.33  
What options did this leave open?  One answer might be that such a 
declaration directs lawmakers to provide a legal remedy against 
private invasions of the stated right.  Instead, the court undertook to 
define both the scope of the term “privacy” and of compensation for 
an invasion, with predictably divided opinions.  Are these then frozen 
into constitutional law?  Another option might have been to make 
clear that the court’s initial answers were only provisional and left 
room for legislative change, like most common law torts.34  But when 
an initiative unambiguously places legal rules governing private 
persons into the constitution, it fails Kadderly’s test for republican 
governance. 
 
30 OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: 
Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125  (1970).  Discovery of the 
misconception led Justice O’Connell to persuade a majority of the 1961–62 Commission 
on Constitutional Revision to propose an independent Oregon “due process” text, which 
however was rejected in the legislative version.  See THE COMMISSION FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR OREGON: A REPORT TO THE 
GOVERNOR AND THE 52ND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, reprinted in 67 OR. L. REV. 127, 
198, 224–31 (1988). 
31 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008).  The same question applies to other rights enhanced by 
adjectives like “inalienable” or “natural.”  See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 
Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333 (2001). 
32 CAL. CONST. art I, § 1 (amended 1972).  At the time, the word referred to increasing 
concerns with the privacy of communications, records, and other information, not personal 
autonomy in matters of sex, reproduction, or mortality. 
33 Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (urine testing of athletes). 
34 Similar questions arise under guarantees of a remedy for traditional torts.  Article I, 
section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, for instance, did not prevent the replacement of tort 
damages for negligently inflicted injury by workers’ compensation laws. 
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A constitutional amendment ordering specific government action35 
leaves lawmakers no choice, as Kadderly demands.  Instead, it 
irrevocably shifts lawmaking to the courts.  When such an initiated 
amendment also requires new appropriations from tax receipts, a 
judicial order addressed to the legislature invades a core function that 
for centuries drove demands for representative government, familiarly 
known as “the power of the purse.”36 
IV 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? 
The constitution’s historic function and text, not only a different 
process of adoption, distinguish laws from constitutional 
amendments.  A principle that constitutions define structures, 
processes, and restraints of government, while rules direct at the 
governed are laws and cannot properly be initiated as amendments to 
the constitution, is clear enough as far as it goes; but it is not all, if a 
republican government must be a government as well as republican.  
Sometimes this may call for a more detailed, differentiated 
assessment than mere form.  It may be one of degree, based on 
historical and functional rather than categorical reasons. 
Requirements of super-majority votes, for instance, clearly deal 
with the law-making process.  It is common to make some legislative 
acts contingent on wider support than a bare majority of votes.37  
How much wider may this be?  A system rigidly demanding 
unanimity for all legislation would deny that elected assemblies 
represent people with divergent interests; it typifies one-party 
dictatorships.  If every member complies and always votes as 
 
35 The amendments authorizing Oregon’s lottery, as well as many bond measures, were 
not mandates but exceptions from general constitutional bans on lotteries and on public 
debts.  A severe restriction of legislative taxing and spending authority, the essential 
instrument of governance, also rings alarm bells if imposed by an initiated amendment.  
See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1992) (expressing 
misgivings about mandatory referrals but choosing to await what voters would do). 
36 Article IX, section 4 of the Oregon Constitution, like Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. 
Constitution, prescribes: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of 
appropriations made by law.” 
37 As a practical matter, many Acts of Congress that deserve enactment but not the time 
for floor debates and votes can pass only by unanimous consent and can be derailed by a 
single member.  The rules of the Senate require a three-fifths majority to end debate, 
effectively setting this hurdle for any controversial bill.  Standing Rules of the Senate, S. 
Doc. No. 110-9, R. XXII (2007).  But both rest on rules adopted by the members and can 
be changed by them. 
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directed, the system fails as republican; when one member does not, it 
fails as government.38  But the judgment involves more than drawing 
a different numerical line.  Taxation offers contemporary illustrations.  
A prohibition on all state taxes in any form would prevent 
“constituting” a government.  A rule that an elected assembly could 
enact taxes only by unanimous votes would contradict republicanism.  
Should lowering the bar to ninety percent save it?  Or to eighty 
percent?  Yet history precludes ruling out super-majorities altogether; 
the U.S. Constitution’s drafters themselves required two-thirds votes 
for amendment and for treaties.39  A republic may demand a higher 
consensus for some decisions than for others. 
The problem comes to a head if the state constitution (or federal 
law) also mandates spending programs.  Nevada faced this dilemma 
when its legislature had a majority to raise taxes for mandated public 
schools, but could not muster the required two-thirds.  After 
unsuccessful special sessions, Nevada’s Governor obtained a decision 
of the Nevada Supreme Court that this super-majority requirement 
had to yield to the substantive obligation to fund schools.40  Three 
years later, in an unrelated context, the same court disavowed giving 
priority to substantive directives over constitutional procedures of 
lawmaking.41  But Nevada’s experience shows how a system that 
invites a majority vote to entrench a popular spending program 
beyond legislative reach and also lets a separate majority vote to 
entrench a tax limitation cannot function as a republican government. 
What institution will analyze and apply the distinction—and apply 
it systematically—regardless of the policy that the particular measure 
serves or of its popularity at the time?  The responsibility falls first on 
the state’s public lawyers, as the attorney general’s opinion 
recognizes.  But theirs should not be the last word.  If they are career 
civil servants, they will hesitate to advance any proposition for which 
they can cite no precedent; without it, critics of an opinion that casts 
doubt on a controversial measure, or sometimes that defends one, will 
 
38 Precedents of requiring unanimity for joint action by holders of autonomous powers, 
as in Poland’s Sejm in the 17th century (and later in the 1919 League of Nations) 
demonstrate their shortcomings as models of republicanism, as even John Calhoun, the 
proponent of “concurrent majorities,” recognized.  See Kronika Sejmowa, 500 Years of 
Poland’s Sejm, http://kronika.sejm.gov.pl/kronika.97/text/spec/spec0.htm (last visited May 
15, 2009); JOHN C. CALHOUN, DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 71 (1851). 
39 U.S. CONST. art. V, art. II, § 2. 
40 See Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003). 
41 Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006). 
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call the opinion political.  The state’s lawyers also may later have the 
task of defending a challenged law in court.  Moreover, government 
counsel are not expected to invite outside briefs or arguments before 
writing a legal opinion, though nothing precludes this step. 
The state’s institution that ordinarily is expected (as well as 
directed by the U.S. Constitution) to assure adherence to the 
Constitution is the judicial department.  The nation has had recent and 
sobering experience with how passive virtues like denials of 
jurisdiction, standing, or the nonjusticiability of so-called political 
questions affect the conduct of government.42  The Oregon Supreme 
Court, in a proper case, should be asked to reconsider the “open 
question” whether Huddleston’s reading of the precedents was wrong, 
and to return to the opposite position that the court took a few years 
earlier.43  Judges should not be deterred from following the 
supremacy clause’s directive by an institutional reluctance to open the 
door to baseless new claims.  While awaiting such a case, however, 
the legislature should do the next best thing: it should, by statute, 
enact a procedure for obtaining advisory opinions of the justices 
(which are not binding adjudications), a device that states have found 
helpful guidance to predict and avoid fiscal and other legal disputes 
more common than rare issues of republicanism.44  As an alternative, 
should the court find an excuse to reject the task, a statute could direct 
the chief justice to designate up to seven senior judges from whom a 
 
42 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); see also Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in 
Governance: Vive la Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273 (2005); Hans A. Linde, 
“A Republic . . . If You Can Keep It,” 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 319–27 (1989). 
43 Supra note 26.  Huddleston relied on two old post-Pacific Telephone U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that affirmed rather than dismissed appeals from state courts, without 
observing that these appeals relied more on substantive due process than on the already 
rejected guarantee clause claims and therefore could not be dismissed.  See Frohnmayer & 
Linde, supra note 24. 
 In 1990, the Oregon Supreme Court, after noting that such claims could not be decided 
in federal courts, wrote: “That does not mean that the states may not adjudicate the 
compatibility of state law with the guarantee clause,” citing its own opinions in Kadderly 
as well as Pacific Telephone.  State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 603–04, 789 P.2d 1352, 1377 
(1990).  State courts have reviewed laws for not being “republican,” both before and after 
Pacific Telephone.  See, e.g., Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479 (Del. 1847), VanSickle v. 
Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223 (Kan. 1973). 
44 Purely advisory opinions are not permissible in the form of adjudications between 
nonadversary parties, see Or. Med. Ass’n v. Rawls, 276 Or. 1101, 557 P.2d 664 (1976), 
but a few states authorize advisory opinions by statute, see Linde, supra note 42, at 1283 
(citing Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845–46 (2001)). 
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panel could be selected to give advisory opinions, after briefing in 
argument, on a constitutional issue, including issues of republican 
governance.  Under either version, such an opinion might properly be 
sought by legislative leaders, by the governor, or by another 
independently elected state official, after consultation with the 
attorney general, on a matter directly within that official’s 
independent authority—for instance, by the secretary of state, as chief 
elections officer, on whether a proposed measure is properly initiated 
as an amendment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
To sum up: Some 150 years ago, Oregon adopted a conventional 
constitution of its time.  Forty years later, in reaction to domination by 
entrenched political parties and interests, the “Oregon System”—in 
effect, Oregon’s second constitution—was designed to make 
government more responsive to the popular demands of the 
Progressive era.  It succeeded as long as its original designers initiated 
laws to enact specific policies and initiated amendments to the 
constitution only to reform the institutions and electoral politics of 
government.  The system went astray when later generations of 
activists began collecting extra signatures on petitions in order to 
erect constitutional monuments to some cause of the moment and 
place them beyond the reach of lawmakers elected to represent all the 
state’s people, both voters and nonvoters, and to take responsibility 
for balancing the state’s books. 
Oregon’s current text can fairly be described as a constitutional 
mess.  But if those responsible for the state’s institutions find it 
dysfunctional, the original conceptions of “laws” and “amendments” 
leaves restoration of the distinction in their hands.  The harder 
question is whether this also is within the capacity of the political 
constitution. 
